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MAJOR COURT DECISIONS OF 1994
The following is a compendium of major communi-
cations law decisions handed down by courts of the
United States in 1994.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUES
Capital Cities/ABC Inc. v. FCC
29 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 1994)
Issue:
Whether the FCC can change a long-term course
of action and justify this change by merely asserting
that it is making the change in accordance with a
court opinion.
Issue:
Whether the FCC properly exercised its power in
issuing an order in a remanded rulemaking proceed-
ing that: eliminated structural separation require-
ments; imposed strengthened nonstructural safe-
guards; and preempted only state regulation of
common carriers' provision of enhanced services that
included interstate as well as intrastate
communications.
Holding:
The FCC did not properly exercise its power in
ordering the elimination of structural separations re-
quirements for operating companies providing en-
hanced services.
Holding: Discussion:
The FCC can justify a change in course by rely-
ing on a court opinion.
Discussion:
This action stemmed from a petition for review of
the FCC's order removing financial interest and syn-
dication restrictions on networks, brought by various
television networks, syndicators, producers, and inde-
pendent television stations. The FCC indicated that
it lifted these restrictions because it was persuaded
by a Seventh Circuit decision that reversed the
FCC's earlier issuance of revised financial interest
and syndication rules. Plaintiffs noted correctly that
administrative agencies are required to give reasons
for changing course. The court was unpersuaded by
the Plaintiff's argument that the reasons given by the
FCC were insufficient. The court determined that
the FCC's assertion that it was following the ration-
ale of the Seventh Circuit was a sufficient reason for
lifting the restrictions.
People of the State of Cal. v. FCC
39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994)
In reviewing the FCC's order, the court must de-
termine whether the FCC's decision is arbitrary or
capricious, and whether the Commission provided a
reasoned analysis based on all of the facts before it.
The court determined that the elimination of the
structural separations requirement was arbitrary and
capricious. In an earlier proceeding in this rulemak-
ing, the FCC indicated that it regarded the un-
bundling of operating companies' services as a key
safeguard from access discrimination against compet-
itors in the enhanced services market. In the pro-
ceeding before the court, the FCC eliminated the un-
bundling requirement without providing an
explanation or reasoned analysis as to why it still
authorized lifting the structural separations
requirement.
CABLE SERVICES ISSUES
National Cable Television Assoc., Inc. v. FCC
33 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
Issue:
Whether telephone companies that provide video
dialtone service or video programmers that use the
service to solicit customers are subject to the
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franchise requirement of section 621(b)(1) of the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.
Holding:
Companies using or running video dialtone ser-
vices in these instances are not subject to the
franchise requirements of the act.
Discussion:
In 1987, the FCC began to reexamine the tele-
phone-cable cross-ownership prohibitions in the
1984 Cable Act. As a result of this reexamination,
the FCC proposed to modify the cross-ownership re-
striction to allow telephone companies to offer a new
video dialtone service. The Commission determined
that the provision of this service would be regulated
under Title II of the Communications Act. The
Commission further determined that companies pro-
viding this service would not be required to obtain a
cable franchise under section 621(b) of the Act.
Various cable industry associations and local
franchising authorities petitioned for review of this
determination. The court gave deference to the
FCC's interpretations of the definitions of "transmis-
sion" and "cable operator" as they applied in the
Act. Using these definitions, the court found that
video dialtone service is a common carriage service
because it is an obligation to provide service indefi-
nitely to all customers. Conversely, cable operators
exercise a significant amount of editorial discretion
as to what programming it will carry. For this rea-
son, the service is excluded from the franchise re-
quirement of the Act.
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC
114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994)
Issue:
Whether the must-carry provisions of the 1992
Cable Act, which require that cable systems set aside
specific portions for the carriage of local broadcast
stations, are violative of the First Amendment.
Holding:
Must-carry provisions are subject to an intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny and serve important government
interests. Summary judgment is not appropriate be-
cause genuine issues of material fact exist.
Discussion:
The Supreme Court held that must-carry provi-
sions would be subject to an intermediate level of
scrutiny because the application of the provision is
content-neutral. Although the provision restricts the
number of available slots for non-local broadcast sta-
tions, this restriction is not made on the basis of
content.
The Court also determined that the interest ad-
vanced by the government, the promotion of wide-
spread dissemination of information, is an important
government interest. The Court, however, found that
there were genuine issues of material fact concerning
whether local broadcast stations required this protec-
tion. Therefore, the Court granted summary
judgement.
COMMON CARRIER ISSUES
Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC
24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
Issue:
Whether the Communications Act of 1934 permits
the FCC to expressly order physical collocation.
Holding:
The Act does not permit the FCC to order physi-
cal collocation.
Discussion:
Local telephone exchange companies petitioned for
review of FCC orders requiring LECs to set aside
portions of their central office to allow competitive
access providers to connect their facilities to the LEC
network through physical collocation. This measure
served as an attempt to level the competitive playing
field of the local exchange market.
The court examined the provision as a physical
taking and analyzed it in relation to the Compensa-
tion Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court
found that the FCC's interpretation would not pro-
duce a compensable taking in all cases. However, in
examining the Communications Act of 1934, the
Court found that the Act gave no express authority
to the FCC to order physical collocation.
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Sprint v. Evans
846 F. Supp. 1497 (N.D. Ala. 1994)
Issue:
Whether referral to the FCC is appropriate on the
issue of whether common carriers are entitled to re-
fuse to carry information that is sexually explicit,
but not yet adjudicated as obscene; and whether re-
ferral to the FCC is appropriate in determining
whether criminal prosecution of an interstate com-
mon carrier under a state's anti-obscenity law is pre-
empted by the Communications Act.
Holding:
It is appropriate to refer issues as to the rights,
responsibilities, and requirements of a common car-
rier to the FCC. It is not appropriate to refer to the
FCC whether criminal prosecution is preempted by
the Communications Act.
Discussion:
Alabama Attorney General Eyans attempted to
criminally prosecute U.S. Sprint under an Alabama
anti-obscenity statute for providing 1-800 telephone
service for sexually explicit calls. Sprint countered by
arguing that the statute did not apply because the
state-to-state telephone calls qualified as interstate
communications, and, therefore, the FCC had
jurisdiction.
The Attorney General filed a motion to refer the
issue to the FCC. The court concluded that the issue
of whether common carriers may refuse service falls
under the FCC's jurisdiction.
However, the court decided not to refer the issue of
whether the FCC preempted criminal prosecution
under the statute to the FCC because the issue is
strictly legal and involves neither the FCC's particu-
lar expertise nor its fact-finding prowess.
COPYRIGHT ISSUES
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.
37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994)
Issue:
Whether photocopying eight articles from a scien-
tific journal for use by Texaco's researchers consti-
tutes fair use to copyright infringement.
Holding:
The fair use defense to copyright infringement
does not apply to the photocopying of the scientific
journal articles.
Discussion:
Under section 107 of the Copyright Act, a court
must consider four factors when analyzing whether a
particular use is fair use. These factors include: the
purpose and character of the use, the nature of the
copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of
the portion used, and the effect upon the potential
market or value. The court found that three of the
four factors favored the publisher of the articles.
In analyzing the purpose and character of the use,
the District Court found that because the primary
aspect of the use was merely to multiply copies, the
use was not transformative. The District Court also
found that the research done in conjunction with the
copied articles was done solely for commercial gain.
The court indicated that the less transformative a
work is, the more significant it will be that the work
is being used for a commercial purpose. Thus, the
District Court concluded that the first factor weighed
in favor of the publisher. The Second Circuit af-
firmed the District Court's decision to favor the pub-
lisher on this factor. However, the Second Circuit
commented that unless the use was "commercial ex-
ploitation," in other words, unless the commercial
gain stemmed directly from the copying, the fact that
the entity was a commercial one did not necessarily
weigh against the use on this factor.
The Second Circuit concluded that the second fac-
tor, the nature of the copyrighted work, weighed in
favor of Texaco because the journal articles copied
were largely of a factual nature. On the third factor,
amount and substantiality of portion used, the court
favored the publisher, because in each case, the en-
tire article was copied. The Second Circuit found
that the fourth factor also weighed in favor of the
publisher because, although difficult to quantify,
Texaco's use did have a negative effect on potential
market or value for the work.
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Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994)
Issue:
Whether a parody that is wholly commercial and
that takes the heart of a copyrighted work qualifies
as fair use.
Holding:
A commercial parody that takes the heart of a
copyrighted work may qualify as fair use within sec-
tion 107 of the Copyright Act.
Discussion:
The holders of the copyright of the song "Pretty
Woman" brought an action for copyright infringe-
ment against the rap group 2 Live Crew for an unli-
censed parody. Defendant argued that the parody
qualified as a fair use.
The court recognized the important literary and
historical value of parody as a form of commentary
and was not troubled by the significant amount that
was appropriated from the original. The court indi-
cated that a significant appropriation is necessary for
a parody in order to evoke the original and comment
on it.
The court was also not troubled by the fact that
the parody itself was explicitly a commercial use.
This factor did not automatically bar a fair use de-
fense. The fact that the market for the original might
be diminished as a result of the critical attack by a
parody also does not bar fair use. The only effect on
the market for the original that weighs against a
finding of fair use occurs if the market for the par-
ody actually supplants the market for the original.
FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
Ameritech Corp. v. United States
867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
Issue:
Whether a provision of the Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984, section 533(b), which pro-
hibits local and regional telephone companies from
providing cable television directly to customers
within their service areas, violates the First
Amendment.
Holding:
Section 533(b) violates the First Amendment right
to free speech.
Discussion:
The court applied an intermediate level of scru-
tiny in analyzing the constitutional challenge. In ap-
plying intermediate scrutiny, a court will uphold a
restriction if it is content-neutral, narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest, and
leaves open ample alternative channels for communi-
cation of the information. The court, in determining
that the provision is content-neutral, found that the
provision restricts programming on the basis of its
form or manner, rather than its substance. Further-
more, the court found that the provision does not
favor some speech over other speech on the basis of
ideas or views expressed.
As for whether section 533(b) was narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant governmental interest, the
court looked at the relevant interest. The provision
was implemented to prevent cross-subsidization and
network discrimination. No convincing evidence was
advanced on the record that other current methods of
regulating anti-competitive behavior would be inef-
fective. Therefore, the provision imposes a greater
than necessary burden on plaintiff's speech, and thus
does not pass muster under the second requirement.
The court concluded that the provision also failed
under the third requirement. The court found that
there were not adequate alternative channels of com-
munication, despite the Government's assertion that
plaintiffs are free to provide video programming to
customers outside their service areas or through in-
dependent media outlets.
Bellsouth Corp. v. United States
868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994)
Issue:
Whether a provision of the Cable Communica-
tions Act of 1984 prohibiting local telephone compa-
nies from providing cable service to customers within
their service areas violates the First Amendment.
Holding:
The provision violates the First Amendment right
to free speech.
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Discussion:
The court utilized an intermediate level of scru-
tiny in this analysis because the restriction on speech
in this case is not content-based. The court deter-
mined that the government must show that a legiti-
mate governmental interest is behind the application
of the restriction and that the regulation will allevi-
ate these harms in a direct and material way. Also,
the restriction must be narrowly tailored to deal with
the harms.
The government stated that the governmental in-
terests were the promotion of diversity and the pre-
vention of anti-competitive conduct, including cross-
subsidization, network discrimination, and pole/con-
duit discrimination by local telephone companies in
cable markets. The court did not reach a decision on
this issue because it found that alternative regula-
tions identified by the plaintiffs would be less restric-
tive than the total ban on speech represented by the
restrictions. For this reason, the court found that the
restriction is not narrowly-tailored, thus it a viola-
tion of the First Amendment right to free speech.
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. United
States
42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994)
Issue:
Whether a provision of the Cable Communica-
tions Act, which prohibits local telephone companies
from providing cable service to customers within
their service area, violates the First Amendment.
Holding:
The provision violates the First Amendment right
to free speech.
Discussion:
In analyzing the provision, the court determined
that the provision itself was content-neutral because
there was no distinction as to the particular message
of the prohibited communications. The government
may impose reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, and manner of speech, provided that the pro-
vision is content-neutral. The court used an interme-
diate level of scrutiny to evaluate the provision.
Under an intermediate level of scrutiny, the provi-
sion must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and there must be sufficient
alternative channels of communication for the infor-
mation. The court found that the governmental in-
terest, the elimination of restraints on fair competi-
tion, is significant. The court, however, did not find
that the provision was narrowly-tailored, because a
less burdensome alternative was available. For in-
stance, Congress could limit the telephone compa-
nies' editorial control over video programming to a
fixed number of channels and require phone compa-
nies to lease the balance of channels to various video
programmers. The presence of this alternative causes
the provision to fail the "narrowly tailored" test, and
as a result, is found to violate the First Amendment
right to free speech.
Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles
13 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir. 1994)
Issue:
Can a city, consistent with the First Amendment,
limit access to a given region of the city to a single
cable television provider by means of an auction
when the facilities of the city are capable of accom-
modating more than one system.
Holding:
A city cannot limit access to a single cable televi-
sion provider by means of an auction where the city
has facilities capable of accomodating more than one
system.
Discussion:
The city of Los Angeles in this case asserted that
this measure, whereby a single cable company was
assigned to a particular region by auction, was ap-
propriate, because the installation of another system
would be a disruption, a visual blight, and a safety
hazard. The facilities of the city were capable of pro-
viding for multiple cable providers in a particular re-
gion. The city offered proof that its concerns were
real and substantial, but the court found that the
measures were not narrowly tailored to deal with
these concerns. It found that limiting speech to a sin-
gle operator is substantially broader than necessary
to achieve the government's interest, and therefore
invalid.
The court held that the First Amendment allows
any and all cable operators to operate in a particular
region. The court characterizes the analysis as a bal-
ance. Once there is more than one cable operator in
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a region, the First Amendment concerns somewhat
are diminished. The court recognizes that at some
point the balance shifts, and the addition of another
cable operator will have created costs greater than
the benefits that it will provide. At this point, the
threat to the First Amendment is not as great. The
court reiterates that it does not have a problem with
the city restricting the number of entrants to the
cable market, provided that the number of entrants is
not restricted to one.
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Uni-
versity of Virginia
18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994)
Issue:
Whether university restrictions against funding re-
ligious activities violates the First Amendment free-
dom of speech and of the press.
Holding:
State university funding restrictions against reli-
gious activities do not violate the First Amendment
where there is a compelling interest by the state uni-
versity to withhold funding.
Discussion:
A religious publication at the University of Vir-
ginia was denied student activity funding based on
the fact that the University chose not to fund reli-
gious groups. The court found that the refusal of the
university to allow funding for religious activities
placed a presumptively unconstitutional condition
upon the access to government benefits. However,
the court found that the University had a compelling
interest in refusing to fund religious organizations
because it chose not to advance religion at the Uni-
versity and because religious activities do not relate
to the purpose of the University. The court found
the University's interest to be valid, and that the re-
striction was narrowly tailored so as to best address
the University's concerns.
In addition, the court concluded that the state uni-
versity's refusal to disburse funds for the religious
publication did not violate the equal protection
clause because the publication failed to argue that a
discriminatory intent existed.
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